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HAVE WE GONE FAR ENOUGH? CHILDREN
WHO ARE SEXUALLY ABUSED AND THE
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE MEANS OF
PROSECUTING THE ABUSER
Children have a very special place in life which law should
reflect.'
Each year over 130,000 children are sexually abused in the
United States.2 While children are raped, sodomized, or physically
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, WORKING PAPER ONE: SUMMARY DATA COMPONENT 13 (1990) (in
1990 it was estimated that 138,257 children were victims of sexual abuse); U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A
COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A BASIC MANUAL 8 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter NCCAN STUDY] (number of children victimized by sexual abuse tripled from 1980 to
1986); see also P. Kienberger Jaudes, M.D. & M. Martone, A.C.S.W., Interdisciplinary Evalu-
ations of Alleged Sexual Abuse Cases, PEDIATRICS, June 1992, at 1164-68 (by age of eighteen,
anywhere from one in ten, to one in three children will experience some form of sexual
abuse).
While many think child abuse is a horror of modern society, the problem was evident in
early Greek and Roman societies. See Margaret J. Ryan, Comment, The Status of Civil Liabil-
ity When Child Protection Workers Fail To Do Their Jobs, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 573, 574 (1990).
"Experts have demonstrated that the further back in history one goes, ... the more likely
children [were] to be killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized, or sexually abused." Id. (quot-
ing John Myers, The Legal Response to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children?. 24 J. FAM.
L 149, 152-53 (1985-86)).
Some of the first reforms in the area of children's rights came between 1640 and 1680,
when the Puritans of Massachusetts enacted the first laws "anywhere in the world" regulat-
ing "unnatural severity" to children. See Laura Oren, The State's Failure To Protect Children
and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 665 (1990). Thereaf-
ter, from 1874 to 1890, organizations such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children were started for the purpose of controlling abuse by Catholic ethnic and immi-
grant working-class families in urban Boston. Id. at 666. These early efforts, however, re-
ceived only nominal support from legislators who were "hesitant to interfere with parental
prerogatives." See Ryan, supra, at 575.
Parents have a natural and fundamental interest in the care and custody of their children
which is derived from the common law and protected by the Constitution. See Edward L.
Thompson, Protecting Abused Children: A Judge's Perspective on Public Law Deprived Child
Proceedings and the Impact of the Indian Child Welfare Acts, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 8 (1990).
However the parent's right to raise a child is not recognized in cases where there is abuse.
Id. In these cases, the parent's right must be balanced against those of the child and where
a conflict exists, the protection of the child is paramount. Id.
This balancing is the basis of the modern approach and is reflected in much of the legis-
lation which has been passed in the twentieth century. See Ryan, supra, at 573. By the early
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assaulted,' their abusers are rarely prosecuted.4 The prosecutors'
ability to press charges against child abusers is hindered by the
large number of unreported cases,6 the unwillingness of the child
to testify against the abuser,6 and often, the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations.' Prosecution is further complicated by the
abuser's control over the victim 8 and the child's inability to realize
1960s, the first state child abuse laws were enacted and today every state has such laws. Id.
at 575. Under these statutes once a suspicion of child abuse has been reported to the child
protective agency, an investigation is initiated to determine whether the child is in immi-
nent danger. Id. With the urging of public interest groups, federal initiatives began with
the Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act in 1974. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5115
(1982 & Supp. 1987). This legislation helped to spur enormous expansion of programs to
prevent child abuse and neglect. See Oren, supra, at 667.
' See NCCAN STUDY, supra note 2, at 7 (child may be sexually abused in variety of ways
including fondling of genitals, intercourse, rape, sodomy and exhibitionism). For represen-
tative cases involving child abuse, see, e.g., Solano County Dep't of Social Services v. Ron
B. (In re Amber B.), 236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (father sexually molested
three-year old daughter); State v. Bentley, 721 P.2d 227, 228 (Kan. 1986) (child fondled
and sexually touched by uncle); State v. Oslund, 469 N.W.2d 489, 489 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (father convicted of engaging in sexual acts with three-year old daughter); State v.
Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (stepfather sexually abused young
girl for seven years); State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (child sexu-
ally abused by friend's father); Hammer v. Hammer, 418, N.W.2d 23, 24 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (indecent touching and oral intercourse forced upon daughter).
" See James W. Harshaw, Comment, Not Enough Time? The Constitutionality of Short Statutes
of Limitations for Civil Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 753, 756 (1989) (chil-
dren may repress feelings regarding their sexual abuse until after statute of limitations has
expired); see also Denise M. DeRose, Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limi-
tations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 191, 192
(1985) (estimating that seventy-five to ninety percent of victims do not reveal that they
have been sexually abused prior to reaching majority); Kimberley Seals-Bressler, Comment,
Balancing the Right to Confrontation and the Need To Protect Child Sexual Abuse Victims: Are
Statutes Authorizing Televised Testimony Serving Their Purpose?, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L REV.
109, 109 (1988) (despite increasing number of reported child sexual abuse cases, conviction
rate of sexual offenders remains low).
' See Thomas G. Burroughs, Note, Retroactive Application of Legislatively Enlarged Statutes
of Limitations for Child Abuse: Time's No Bar to Revival, 22 IND. L REV. 989, 989 (1989).
Charges are only filed in twenty-four percent of all child sex abuse cases. Id. at 989-94.
Once a criminal proceeding is commenced, the probability of conviction is even lower. Id.
at 994; see also Note, Sexually Abused Children: The Best Kept Legal Secret, 3 HUMAN RTs. ANN.
441, 446 (1986) (in majority of cases, courts rely on child's testimony which they view with
great skepticism because evidence considered unreliable).
' See infra notes 21-22 (addressing adverse effects child suffers from testifying against
sexual abuser).
' See infra notes 97-100 (discussing factors which cause statute of limitations to expire
before authorities can take action against abuser).
' See, e.g., People v. Wilkerson, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1571, 1579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (child
acquiesced to sexual abuse after implied threat); State v. Pick, No. C8-88-1026, 1989 WL
17576, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1989) (parent told child she would be sent to foster
home if child reported sexual abuse); People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 411, 502 N.E.2d
577, 578, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (1986) (stepchildren afraid to resist sexual demands due
to stepfather's threats of physical injury); Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (child conditioned to accept advances under direct threat); State v. Grif-
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that he or she has been injured. 9
In an attempt to circumvent these barriers, courts have allowed
the use of closed-circuit television to protect the child witness
from the trauma of testifying in court before the defendant,10 ex-
panded the hearsay exception to allow testimony if the child lacks
a motive to lie, or if the child uses sexual terminology unexpected
of a child, and created provisions that toll the statute of limita-
tions until the abusive conduct is discovered. While these efforts
to aid children were initially established by the courts," many
state legislatures have followed the courts' initiatives and codified
the closed-circuit television procedure and tolling provision into
law.1 4 Although these statutes are the result of carefully balancing
an alleged abuser's constitutional rights and the state's interest in
fin, 754 P.2d 965, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (defendant threatened to "smack" child if she
told anyone about sexual advances); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 24-25 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987) (father threatened daughter with harm if she disclosed the conduct).
The most common scenario involves a father sexually abusing his daughter. See Jocelyn
B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an Equitable Application
of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189, 2193 (1991); see also Margaret J. Allen,
Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 609, 609-10
(1983) (explaining that child sexual abuse is typically incestuous); Note, The Testimony of
Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807
n.14 (1985) [hereinafter Legislative Innovations] (sexual abuser is family member in ninety-
two percent of child sex abuse cases). In incestuous situations, the father is the dominating
family figure who uses his authority to manipulate his daughter into believing that the
activity is normal. See Lamm, supra, at 2192. While he may often be viewed by society as an
introverted, quiet person, in actuality he may be an individual seeking control over his wife
and children. See Allen, supra, at 611-12.
The victim, on the other hand, copes with the continued abuse through numbing, denial,
and amnesia. See Lamm, supra, at 2194 n.37. By the time the victim is an adult, long-term
effects will already have manifested. See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical
Association, Violence Against Women, Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267 JAMA 3184-89
(1992). Long-term effects include severe depression, suicidal tendencies, feelings of aliena-
tion, and difficulties relating to men and women. Id. Another long-term effect may be pro-
miscuous behavior or involvement in sexually abusive relationships. See Burroughs, supra
note 5, at 991 n.18.
' See Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 25 (victim failed to understand abusive nature of father);
see also Harshaw, supra note 4, at 757 (sexually abused child is often confused and may be
unable to perceive wrongs); Lamm, supra note 8, at 2193 ("with persistent threats as to
consequences of disclosure, an incestuous father can manipulate his daughter into believing
she is a willing partner").
" See infra notes 57-66 (discussing Supreme Court's holding in Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990)).
" See infra note 70 (discussing various courts' recognition that hearsay testimony and
other procedures are more appropriate when victim is child).
1" See infra notes 139-142 (discussing statutes which toll statute of limitations until child
reaches majority or responsible adult obtains knowledge of abuse).
1" See infra note 43 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of various hearsay
exceptions).
" See infra notes 139-41 (citing examples of tolling provisions).
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protecting sexually abused children, it seems that most legislatures
have tipped the scales of justice in favor of protecting the child."
However, although initial steps to aid children in reporting abuse
and testifying at trial have been taken, further liberalization is
necessary to reach the ultimate goal of having every abused child
report and testify.
Part One of this Note will examine the constitutionality of the
Supreme Court's expansion of hearsay exceptions and the use of
closed-circuit television in light of the Sixth Amendment's Con-
frontation Clause. Part Two will analyze the issue of tolling the
statute of limitations in criminal cases, and suggest that every state
apply legislation that tolls the statute of limitations until a victim is
twenty-three.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: CHILD V. ABUSER
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 16 guarantees a de-
fendant the right to confront his or her accusers at trial,' 7 and is
often thought to enhance the fact-finding process.' A literal in-
terpretation of the Confrontation Clause would require a defend-
" See infra notes 21 & 138 and accompanying text (noting how Supreme Court and state
legislatures effectively provide sexually abused children greater protection without circum-
venting abuser's substantive rights).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Id.
7 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) ("We have never doubted, therefore,
that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with wit-
nesses appearing before the trier of fact."); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)
(Confrontation Clause provides protection for criminal defendant, including right to physi-
cally meet face-to-face those testifying against him); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730, 749-50 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (right to confront witness forms core of Con-
frontation Clause); 'California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970). The Court has also
stated that even in cases where a defendant is denied the right to confront his accuser at
trial, the "literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial . . . forms the core of
the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause." Id.; cf Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
403 (1965) (Sixth Amendment right of accused to confront witnesses against him is made
obligatory on states by Fourteenth Amendment); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242 (1895) (primary goal of Confrontation Clause was to prevent ex parte affidavits in lieu
of confrontation between witness and accused).
18 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20 (face-to-face confrontation "may confound and undo the
false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult."); see also Stincer, 482 U.S.
at 739 ("[t]he right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of promoting relia-
bility in a criminal trial"); cf Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 ("[T]here is something deep in
human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as es-
sential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution"); infra note 19 (citing cases denying defend-
ant the absolute right to confront his accuser).
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ant have the right to a face-to-face meeting with every witness. A
defendant's right to confront, however, is not without limita-
tions, 19 and courts have refused to read the Confrontation Clause
as providing a defendant an absolute right to physical confronta-
tion.20 This has been especially apparent in cases involving child
abuse.21 Often, when the child sees the defendant face-to-face, he
or she becomes silent and refuses to testify22 and therefore the
courts have sought to carve out areas of protection for child wit-
nesses, 28 specifically in the interpretation of a defendant's right to
confront the witness.
A. Right to Confront
In 1990, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases in-
volving the sexual abuse of children. 24 The first case, Idaho v.
Wright,28 addressed the issue of whether the testimony of a doctor
who examined an allegedly abused child could be admitted as evi-
10 See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990) (Court has never held Confron-
tation Clause guarantees absolute right to face-to-face meeting with witness at trial); Coy,
487 U.S. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (defendant's right to physically face those
testifying against him, even if at core of Confrontation Clause, is not absolute); Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (Court has recognized that competing interests, if
closely examined, may warrant eliminating confrontation at trial); Miranda v. Cooper, 967
F.2d 392, 401 (10th Cir. 1992) (defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses is neither
absolute nor unlimited and is tempered by policy considerations).
"0 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844. The Court stated: "We have never held, however, that the
Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses against them at trial." Id.
"' See id. at 856-57 (where there is finding that child would suffer from trauma of testify-
ing in presence of defendant, Confrontation Clause does not prohibit use of videotape pro-
cedure which ensures reliability of evidence); Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th
Cir. 1989) (court allowed child victim to testify by videotaped procedure to avoid psycho-
logical harm of testifying in presence of defendant), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990).
For examples of cases where the Supreme Court has stressed the need to protect chil-
dren from adverse effects of the courtroom, see Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 (concluding that
state interest in protecting child abuse victims may sufficiently outweigh defendant's right
to face his accuser); Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60 (allowing full disclosure would unnecessarily
sacrifice Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting child abuse victim's informa-
tion); cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (safeguarding
physical or psychological well-being of minor is compelling).
2 Craig, 497 U.S. at 842. The Court found children would react differently if they were
forced to testify in front of the defendant. Id. A psychologist testified that one would not
be able to communicate effectively, another would withdraw completely, while others
would refuse to talk or choose their own subject regardless of the question asked. Id. (citing
Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1128-29 (Md. 1989)).
,8 See infra notes 46 & 50 (discussing circumstances where children were afforded
greater rights).
Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
13 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
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dence.2" Although this evidence was held inadmissible as hear-
say,27 the criteria adopted by the Wright court nevertheless broad-
ened the scope of protection afforded sexually abused children.28
In the second case, Maryland v. Craig,29 the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a statute"0 which allowed an abused child to testify
via closed-circuit television out of the presence of the defendant.3 1
1. Idaho v. Wright
In Idaho v. Wright, the defendant was charged with sexually
abusing her two daughters.3 The examining doctor testified that
the physical condition of one of the children strongly suggested
sexual abuse.3 3 The Supreme Court held that the doctor's testi-
mony concerning the child's statements were inadmissible as hear-
ge Id. at 809. A doctor testified regarding a conversation he had with a child about ap-
parent sexual abuse. Id. The prosecution tried to admit the doctor's testimony pursuant to
an Idaho statute which allowed for admission of hearsay even if the declarant was available.
Id. at 811-12.
27 Id. at 827. The Court held that the testimony presented by the doctor did not fit into
the hearsay exception of the Idaho statute because it lacked the required guarantee of
trustworthiness. Id. For other cases discussing the need for guarantees of trustworthiness
and reliability, see, e.g., Shirley v. Seabold, 929 F.2d 272, 274-75 (6th Cir. 1991) (state-
ments offered do not satisfy Wright test "of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
due to victim's incoherence); Miller v. Miller, 784 F. Supp. 390, 395 (E.D. Mich. 1992)(hearsay did not overcome presumption of unreliability so confession could not be admitted
without violating defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
38 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. Whereas previous courts set forth criteria to be used in
determining whether to admit hearsay, the Wright Court stated that such a demand must
be judged from the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 820. For cases eliminating the re-
quirement that the witness be unavailable for admission of hearsay, see, e.g., White v. Illi-
nois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992) (admitting hearsay where declarant is available and elimi-
nating unavailability requirement outlined in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)); United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (same).
497 U.S. 836 (1990).
I ld. at 860. The state invoked a procedure that permitted a child to testify through a
closed circuit television. Id. at 840. This procedure requires the child witness, prosecutor,
and defense counsel to withdraw to a separate room where the child is examined; the
judge, jury and the defendant view from the courtroom. Id. at 841.
"1 Id. at 857. The Court held where the trauma caused by the presence of the defendant
would impair the child's ability to communicate, the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit
use of this technique. Id.
2 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 809. The defendant had joint custody where each parent
would have custody for six months. Id. At the time of the abuse the children were living
with the defendant-mother and reported the abuse to their father's girlfriend. Id. The
girlfriend immediately reported the incident to the police and took one of the victims to
the hospital the next day. Id.
33 Id. Dr. John Jambura, a pediatrician with extensive experience in child abuse cases,
was the doctor who examined the child. Id. He found a physical situation "strongly sugges-
tive of sexual abuse with vaginal conduct" which he felt was confirmed by his interview
with the child. Id. at 809-11.
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say due to the lack of precautions taken to ensure the reliability of
the child's comments." The Court did suggest, however, that had
the doctor not asked blatantly leading questions with a precon-
ceived notion about what the child would be disclosing, his testi-
mony would have been admissible. 5
Idaho law allowed the admission of hearsay if it dealt with a
material fact, was more probative than any other evidence, served
the interest of justice, and bore an indicia of reliability." The Su-
preme Court, applying Idaho law, found that the doctor's testi-
mony lacked the indicia of reliability required for admission under
the residual hearsay exception3 7 and was not persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the admission was a harmless error.3 8 Citing
their holding in Ohio v. Roberts,3 9 the Court explained that the tes-
" Id. at 827. The lack of safeguards made the statements by the child questionable as to
their reliability. Id. Among those noted by the Supreme Court of Idaho were the lack of
videotaping, blatantly leading questions, and a preconceived idea about what the child
should be disclosing. Idaho v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1230 (1989), af'd, 497 U.S. 805
(1990); see also United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 394 (1st Cir.) ("to avoid conflict with
the Confrontation Clause, evidence admitted under the residual [hearsay exception] must
possess a high degree of independent trustworthiness" (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 821 (1990))), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1991).
" See Wright, 497 U.S. at 826. The child made several statements with the requisite level
of reliability but the previous prompting by the doctor negated the child's spontaneity as
an indicator of trustworthiness. Id.
" Id. at 812. Idaho's residual hearsay exception provides that statements with guaran-
tees of trustworthiness are allowed as an exception to the hearsay rule if: "(A) The state-
ment is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative . . . than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; [and] (C)
[the] purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission into
evidence." IDAHO RULE EVID. § 803(24).
"7 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 813. The Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the
child's statements lacked reliability and should not have been admitted. Id.; see also Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980). The test for indicia of reliability requires the hearsay to
either fall within a firmly-rooted exception or be supported by a showing of trustworthi-
ness. Id.
An example of a statement containing indicia of reliability was found where statements
were given voluntarily in front of two government employees and both of declarants' attor-
neys, in accordance with a plea agreement where the government was taking notes, and
where the declarants knew the statements were to be used in a further investigation.
United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 1991); see Shirley v. Seabold, 929 F.2d
272, 274 (6th Cir. 1991) (statement admissible when declarant's truthfulness so clear that
cross-examination would be of "marginal utility" (citing Wright, 497 U.S. 820 (1990))). But
see Lee v. McCaughtry, 892 F.2d 1318, 1324 (7th Cir.) ("Violations of the Confrontation
Clause have been found 'even though the statements in issue were admitted under an ar-
guably recognized hearsay exception.'" (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156
(1970))), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1006 (1990).
Wright, U.S. at 3145 (recognizing possibility that admission of unreliable statements
may have prejudiced jury).
- 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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timony was only admissible if it encompassed a firmly-rooted hear-
say exception such as an excited utterance, dying declaration or
the medical treatment exception, or fell within the residual hear-
say exception.40 The firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions are recog-
nized by the courts as inherently trustworthy, whereas the residual
hearsay exception is less established and is only admitted where
the facts demonstrate reliability, equal to that of the firmly-rooted
hearsay exception. Since the doctor's testimony did not fall
within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception, admissibility had to be
established within the residual hearsay exception.42
The Court noted that the indicia of reliability could be estab-
lished if the child's statements were spontaneous and consistent,
made with sexual terminology unexpected of a child of similar
age, and if the child lacked the motive to lie.43 Satisfaction of
these requirements would help support the admission of the doc-
40 Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 (indicia of reliability for admission of hearsay can be estab-
lished under the firmly-rooted hearsay exception or residual hearsay exception); see Roberts,
448 U.S. at 65. The Roberts Court noted that the firmly-rooted hearsay exception "rest[s]
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports
with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' " Id. at 66 (citing Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). The residual hearsay exception is allowed only when
reliability is established and " 'there is no material departure from the reason of the gen-
eral rule.' " Id. at 65 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 91, 107 (1934)); see also
United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1991) (hearsay admitted if sufficiently
reliable or falls within accepted hearsay exception); United States v. Workman, 860 F.2d
140, 144 (4th Cir. 1988) (same); Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987)
(same).
41 Wright, 497 U.S. at 817. Evidence admitted under the firmly-rooted hearsay exception
is reliable because judicial and legislative experience has long found certain out-of-court
statements reliable. Id. The residual hearsay exception, in contrast, includes instances not
falling within a recognized hearsay exception but surrounding circumstances indicate
enough reliability to be admitted. Id.; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (explaining and defining two
types of hearsay exceptions); see supra note 40 (listing cases that recognize difference be-
tween different types of hearsay exceptions).
42 Wright, 497 U.S. at 818. The State recognized that the child's statements did not fall
within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception and therefore, had to establish reliability under
the residual hearsay exception. Id.
48 Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. The Wright Court held that factors such as unexpected termi-
nology and lack of motive to lie, although indicative of trustworthiness, are not exhaustive.
Id.; see White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992). "A statement that has been offered in
a moment of excitement-without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of one's
exclamation-may justifiably carry more weight ... than a similar statement offered in the
relative calm of the courtroom." Id.; Dana v. Dep't of Corrections, 958 F.2d 237, 239 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992). The Dana court noted that the child's testimony
was trustworthy since the revelations were spontaneous, consistent, there was no motive to
lie, and a graphic description would not be expected from a four year old child. Id. But see
Martinez v. McCaughtry, 951 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1991). By relying too heavily on
these factors, a court may neglect its duty to inquire beyond the inference and look into
the record for support of the statement. Id.
[Vol. 8:339
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tor's testimony under the residual hearsay exception, insulate the
child from the trauma of testifying," and assist in the effective
prosecution of the defendant.45 By allowing these factors to be
considered in determining whether an indicia of reliability had
been established, the Wright court provided more flexibility in ap-
plying hearsay rules to aid children in testifying.46 This refuted
the state court's decision which suggested that specific require-
ments which are often impractical, such as videotaping and
notetaking, were prerequisites to establishing reliability.4 7
44 Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22. Factors which help to establish the reliability of a child's
statements, and free the child from taking the stand, are spontaneous and consistent repeti-
tion, use of terminology unexpected of a child, and lack of a motive to lie. Id.; see Dana,
958 F.2d at 238. The court, insulating the child from the trauma of testifying, held that
the victimized child did not have to take the stand to testify in the prosecution against his
father. Id.; see also McCafferty v. Leapley, 944 F.2d 445, 451 (8th Cir.) (child's statement to
teacher and psychologist were admissible and as a result child was spared trauma of testify-
ing in abuser's trial), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1277 (1991). See generally Kermit V. Lipez, The
Child Witness in Sexual Abuse Cases in Maine: Presentation, Impeachment, and Controversy, 42
ME. L. REV. 283, 352 (1990). "Throughout the literature on sexual abuse there is a legiti-
mate concern that the trial process revictimizes the already abused child." Id.
4' Wright, 497 U.S. at 827 (reversing defendant's conviction because victim's statements
to doctor were inadmissible); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (child abuse
typically difficult to prosecute because child is usually only witness); see Theresa Cusick, Tele-
vised Justice: Toward a New Definition of Confrontation Under Maryland v. Craig, 40 CATH. U.
L. REV. 967, 967 (1991). "Child sex abuse victims are usually the only direct witnesses to
their abuse and most states do not require the testimony . . . to be corroborated." Id.;
Catherine M. Mahady-Smith, Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: An-
other Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721, 731 (1985). The child's testimony is often the
only available evidence in obtaining a conviction, and the child will often retreat into si-
lence. Id.
46 Wright, 497 U.S. at 822; see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Court al-
lowed children to testify via one-way television where they were unable or unwilling to
testify in presence of defendant); see also Wright, 497 U.S. at 818 (courts must decide if
leading questions go too far and infringe on defendant's rights or are justified due to
child's situation); JOHN MYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAW & PRACTICE § 4.6., at 129, 134 (1987)
(traditional practice restricts use of leading questions). For cases illustrating the new flexi-
bility of the courts, see, e.g., Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1087 (7th Cir. 1992)
(abused child's testimony admitted despite bizarre aspects of story, piecemeal fashion of
story, and prompting by adult questioning); McCafferty, 944 F.2d at 451 (child's statements
to teacher and psychologist were admitted as evidence); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d
385, 394 (1st Cir.) (social worker allowed to testify regarding observation that victim's half-
sister played with anatomically correct dolls despite defendant's objection that it was hear-
say), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 201 (1991); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 946 (4th Cir.
1988) (noting majority of courts have held child's statements admissible even if child in-
competent to testify); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (spon-
taneous declaration allowed despite child's incompetence).
"' Wright, 497 U.S. at 818. The Idaho Supreme Court suggested that without certain
precautions such as videotaping or notetaking the statements would not be reliable. Id. The
United States Supreme Court, although admitting these procedures would enhance relia-
bility, rejected the idea stating that child abuse cases often do not allow for these tech-
niques and, as such, they should not be dispositive in determining reliability. Id.
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The Wright majority noted that a bright-line test for admissibil-
ity under the residual hearsay exception should not be applied in
child sex abuse cases,"" since the child's testimony is often difficult
to obtain, 9 and reiterated its policy of consistently affording
greater protection to children. 50 The Court concluded that hear-
say evidence must be analyzed in the context of all the circum-
stances, and that the final determination of admission be made on
a case by case basis. 51
Since this decision added to the discretion courts have in deter-
mining what constitutes hearsay,52 they must be careful in its ap-
plication. Admitting hearsay creates a confrontation issue because
" Id. at 819. "We decline to read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived and
artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional interviewers in which chil-
dren make hearsay statements against a defendant." Id.
" Id. at 818 (children's statements concerning abuse arise in various situations and re-
quire flexibility in applying hearsay rules to facilitate the admission of victim's statements);
see supra note 22 & infra note 61 (explaining difficulties often faced by authorities when
trying to elicit testimony from child sex abuse victims).
80 Wright, 497 *U.S. at 821-22 (courts have established factors for establishing reliability
particular to children); see Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 (recognizing that physical and psychologi-
cal well-being of children may outweigh defendant's right to face accuser); Lipez, supra
note 44, at 286. Typically, the abused child is the only witness to the sexual abuse. Id.
Unlike other cases where there are generally additional witnesses, verifiable damage to
persons, property, or contraband, in the typical sexual abuse case the focus of the prosecu-
tion is the testimony of the child. Id.
For examples of cases affording children greater rights by allowing leading questions, see
United States v. Demarrias, 876 F.2d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1989) (court permitted plaintiff to
ask child leading questions); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 1978)
(noting in dicta that permitting leading questions of minor witnesses was not unusual occur-
rence), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979); Rotolo v. United States, 404 F.2d 316, 317 (5th
Cir. 1968) (leading questions permitted of nervous and upset fifteen year old witness); An-
telope v. United States, 185 F.2d 174, 175 (i0th Cir. 1950) (leading questions permitted of
minor statutory rape victim). See generally Legislative Innovations, supra note 8, at 808. One
commentator has noted that with a growing public awareness of the difficulties of prosecut-
ing child sex abuse cases, state legislatures have acted to strengthen the prosecutor's hand,
while easing the burden that the judicial system places on the child victim." Id. For exam-
ple, many "states have broadened their definition of child sex abuse, extended statutes of
limitation, and eased various rules of procedures and evidence." Id.
51 Wright, 497 U.S. at 820. Evidence used in establishing reliability, however, is limited
to circumstances that make the statement inherently trustworthy. Id. at 819. These state-
ments cannot be given the status of trustworthiness solely because they are corroborated by
reliable evidence. Id. at 824; see United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir.)
("[t]est must now conform to the requirement that the hearsay ... be reliable 'by virtue of
its inherent trustworthiness' " (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 262 (1991).
5' See Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. Courts have great discretion in determining what state-
ments are reliable. Id. However, they must be careful to ensure that admission of evidence
is based on inherent trustworthiness and not by reference to other evidence. Id. This pre-
vents bootstrapping which could lead to admission of unreliable evidence. Id. at 833; see
also United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 394 (ist Cir.) (advocating conservative approach
to hearsay exceptions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 201 (1991).
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the defendant is limited to the examination of facts obtained sec-
ond-hand and denied the opportunity to extract the story from
the actual victim.5" Although the Supreme Court broadened hear-
say exceptions in child sex abuse cases, 5 it has consistently bal-
anced the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights with the interest
of the state to ensure the defendant's rights are protected. 55 This
balancing is apparent in Maryland v. Craig where the Court
weighed the interests of both sides before holding that testimony
received via closed-circuit television was constitutional. 56
53 Wright, 497 U.S. at 809 (defendant limited to second-hand facts when limited to cross-
examination of doctor who examined victim and not victim); McCafferty v. Leapley, 944
F.2d 445, 454 (8th Cir. 1991) (defendant limited to second-hand facts when only allowed
to cross-examine clinical psychologist and teacher of victim, but not actual victim), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1277 (1992); Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 682 (10th Cir. 1990)
(defendant not allowed to cross-examine the victim, but only caseworker and police officer
who took victim's statement); Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1224 (7th Cir. 1989) (de-
fendant limited to facts elicited on cross-examination of victim's psychologist and not vic-
tim), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988)
(right to cross-examine ensures integrity of fact-finding process); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 54 (1987) (no confrontation problem because cross-examination complete).
But see United States v. Riggi, 951 F.2d 1368, 1375 (3d Cir. 1991) (absence of proper
confrontation calls integrity of fact-finding process into question).
" Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. The federal courts admit hearsay where the child's statement
includes spontaneity and consistent repetition, use of terminology unexpected of a child,
and lack of motive to fabricate. Id.; see Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1079 (7th Cir.
1992) (court's basis for admitting hearsay was general consistency of details, element of
spontaneity, and use of childlike terms); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir.
1988). The child's extensive knowledge of sexual activities and lack of motive to lie were
considerations in admitting hearsay of child. Id. The Morgan court explained that sponta-
neity serves as a check against the threat of fabrication. Id. at 946. But see Judy Yun, Note,
A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1745, 1756 (1983) (discussing criticism aimed at courts which place undue emphasis on
spontaneity requirement in child abuse cases).
" Wright, 497 U.S. at 825 (defendant's rights were violated when hearsay was admitted
without showing of indicia of reliability); see White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct 736, 741 (1992)
(acknowledging state's attempt to "steer a middle course" between admitting hearsay that
protects state's interest and safeguarding defendant's constitutional rights (citing Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980)); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) ("Sixth
Amendment rights must also be interpreted in the context of the necessities of trial and
the adversary process."); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (in camera review
of sensitive evidence protects interests of defendant as well as commonwealth); Roberts, 448
U.S. at 64 (state has strong interest in effective law enforcement which must be weighed
against other considerations such as defendant's constitutional rights); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("[Gjeneral rules ... must occasionally give way to consid-
erations of public policy and the necessities of the case."); cf Taylor v. United States, 484
U.S. 400, 410-16 (1988) ("State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is suffi-
cient to justify deviation from rules [regarding] presentation of witnesses and evidence");
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (state's right to conduct orderly trial given
priority over defendant's right to be present at trial, where trial judge removed defendant
for disruptive behavior).
See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (child testimony received through television monitor was
constitutional after balancing rights of both parties).
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2. Maryland v. Craig
In Maryland v. Craig, a kindergarten teacher was accused of sex-
ually abusing several of her students.57 The Court, in determining
that the children would be adversely affected by testifying in the
presence of the defendant, allowed the children to testify by way
of closed-circuit television." To safeguard the defendant's consti-
tutional rights, the Court mandated that the child's testimony be
subject to cross-examination, and given under oath in view of the
jury."' The Court explained that this procedure would be re-
stricted and utilized only in situations where the trauma of testify-
ing would inhibit the child from serving as a witness.60 This find-
ing of trauma is often established by a psychologist's testimony
regarding the effects of testifying on the victim. 1
The Craig Court limited this "trauma of testifying" to situations
where the defendant, and not the courtroom setting, was the
cause of the trauma.62 If the courtroom setting was the cause of
", Id. at 840. The defendant owned and operated her own kindergarten and had alleg-
edly abused a number of her students. Id.
" Id. at 840-41. The procedure allowed for testimony to be given via closed circuit tele-
vision when it was demonstrated that the abused child would suffer emotional distress from
testifying in the presence of the defendant. Id. Under the Maryland closed circuit proce-
dure, the child witness, the prosecutor, and defense counsel withdraw to a separate room
away from the defendant, judge, and jury. Id. However, the defendant remains in elec-
tronic communication with defense counsel, and objections are made and ruled on as if the
witness were testifying in the courtroom. Id.
" Id. at 857 (defendant's rights were protected as victim was cross-examination under
oath and observed by judge, jury, and defendant during testimony); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The Green Court set out the following guidelines to safeguard a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where face-to-face confrontation has been denied: (1)
the witness must give testimony under oath; (2) the defense must be given the opportunity
to cross-examine the witness; and (3) the jury must be able to observe the demeanor of the
witness while the witness testifies. Id.; see Hardy v. Wigginton, 922 F.2d 294, 299 (6th Cir.
1990). The court upheld a procedure similar to Craig where there was a finding of specific
traumatization, and allowed a videotape of the witness, taken in the presence of the de-
fendant, to be admitted. Id. In addition, the defendant was allowed full and effective cross-
examination and the jury was able to scrutinize the demeanor of the witness. Id. at 296;
Vigil v. Tansy, 917 F.2d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 1990) (videotape in presence of defendant
did not violate defendant's rights since he was afforded face-to-face confrontation), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 995 (1991).
0 Craig, 497 U.S. at 847 (trial judge must first find that testifying in courtroom will
result in serious emotional distress) (citing MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-
102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)).
" See Hardy, 922 F.2d at 296 (board-certified psychologist indicated that testifying in
court might permanently damage victim); Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1225 (7th Cir.
1989) (ruling child victim was unavailable because of psychologist's testimony that testify-
ing would have a traumatic impact), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990).
62 Craig, 497 U.S. at 885 (trauma must be result of testifying in presence of defendant);
Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming lower court's decision to
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the distress, there were alternate means of lessening the intimida-
tion, such as having the child testify on videotape before trial,63 or
in a less intimidating setting,64 both of which would be in the pres-
ence of the defendant. If the trauma was due to the presence of
the defendant, then the child would testify in another room in
front of the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel while the de-
fendant and jury viewed the testimony via closed-circuit televi-
sion. 65 During cross-examination, the defendant remains in con-
stant communication with his attorney to ensure full and effective
cross-examination.66 In allowing removal of the victim from de-
fendant's physical presence, the Craig decision reflected concerns
previously noted by the Court in Coy v. Iowa.6 7
In Coy, the Court questioned whether a defendant's right to
physically confront his or her accuser was absolute, 68 and held
that an Iowa statute which presumed that confrontation would
have adverse effects on children, without requiring individualized
findings of such effects, was unconstitutional.6 9 However, in dicta,
the Court posited that if a statute required individualized findings
allow videotape when witness is traumatized by presence of defendant); see Bryan H.
Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, And the Power and Limits of Textualism,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1368 (1991) (finding of trauma must be result of testifying in
presence of defendant and not from testifying in courtroom).
" See Hardy, 922 F.2d at 300 (videotaped testimony taken weeks before trial in presence
of defendant was admissible); Vigil, 917 F.2d at 1279 (videotaping witness in defendant's
presence is allowed when courtroom itself would be traumatic experience for child).
Craig, 497 U.S. at 856. The Court suggested that it would be willing to change the
procedure to allow a witness to testify in a less intimidating room, but still in the presence
of the defendant. Id.
" Id. at 841; see supra note 58 (discussing Maryland's closed circuit television
procedure).
" Craig, 497 U.S. at 841-42; see supra note 58 & 59 (discussing Maryland's closed circuit
television and precautions taken to protect defendant's rights when witness is removed to
separate room).
*" 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). In Coy, the Court rejected a statute which presumed adverse
effects on children testifying at trial without mandating that the court make individualized
findings of adverse effects prior to invoking the procedure. Id. at 1021; cf. Hardy, 922 F.2d
at 296 n.1. Although the relevant Kentucky statute in Hardy presumed adverse effects on
children testifying in court, the trial court relied on other grounds to invoke the videotap-
ing procedure. Id.
" Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021. The Court has found some exceptions to the implicit rights
found in the Confrontation Clause, but has not decided whether there are any exceptions
to the literal right to confront the accuser. Id.
"' Id. (statute which presumed adverse consequences on children testifying in front of
defendant found to be unconstitutional); Hardy, 922 F.2d at 296 n.l (noting that trial
judge believed statute was unconstitutional due to similarity of statute struck down in. Coy);
Todd H. Neuman, Note, A Child's Well Being v. A Defendant's Right to Confrontation, 93 W.
VA. L. REV. 1061, 1080 (1991) (statute presuming need to protect child from adverse effects
of testifying will not withstand constitutional attacks).
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of adverse effects on children, it could also prescribe the use of a
television monitor to receive the child's testimony." Applying the
Coy rationale, the Craig Court required individualized findings of
adverse effects, and concluded that use of a television to transmit
the testimony was constitutional and did not impair the defend-
ant's rights. 1 While Wright questioned the admissibility of hearsay
because the right to cross-examine was hindered, the Craig Court
preserved the defendant's right to cross-examine, 2 despite the ab-
sence of the victim from the courtroom.7 3
B. Right to Cross-Examine
The Craig Court listed several factors that safeguard a defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when he or she has
been denied the opportunity to physically confront the accuser.74
The most important of these factors is the defendant's right to
cross-examine his or her accuser.7 5
70 See Craig, 497 U.S. 857-58 (right to confrontation may be abridged where there is
specific finding of necessity); Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1991) (up-
holding Connecticut statute allowing videotaped testimony where there is specific finding
of need in light of Craig); see also Neuman, supra note 69, at 1073 (if Court makes specific
finding of necessity, confrontation right of defendant may give way to state interest of
protecting child). But see Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1990). The fact
that a specialized finding is required to permit the use of videotaped testimony does not
conversely mean that defendant can demand a psychiatric evaluation when the child is will-
ing to take the stand. Id.; Virgin Islands v. Riley, 750 F. Supp. 727, 728 (D. Virgin Islands
1990). The court denied the use of videotaped testimony because there was no child wit-
ness protection statute applicable in the district. Id.
71 See supra note 70 (explaining how lower courts interpreted Craig in deciding whether
testimony of child through television with specific finding of adverse effects is admissible).
"' Craig, 497 U.S. at 849-50. The Court required that the child be competent to testify,
that the child's testimony be given under oath, in front of the jury, and that the child be
subject to cross-examination. Id. The Court concluded that retention of these elements
ensured that the testimony would be tested in an adversarial context. Id.; see California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). The statements by a witness given at a preliminary hear-
ing, and subsequently used at trial were not in violation of the Confrontation Clause, de-
spite the fact that the witness was not present at the trial. Id. The statements in question
were held admissible because the defendant had the previous opportunity to cross-examine
the witness under oath before a judicial tribunal ensuring his rights were protected. Id.;
Neuman, supra note 69, at 1070 (to extent that testimony is given under oath, subject to
cross-examination, and made in front of judge, Confrontation Clause is not violated).
"" See Craig, 497 U.S. at 857. In Craig, the child was placed in a room adjacent to the
courtroom with the judge, opposing counsel, and technicians present. Id. at 841. A televi-
sion monitor was set up in the courtroom to enable the defendant and jury to view the
child's testimony from the courtroom. Id. The defendant was allowed to communicate with
his lawyer to ensure full cross-examination of the child. Id. at 841-42.
7 See supra notes 58 & 59 (explaining safeguards used to protect defendant's rights when
witness is removed from defendant's presence).
768 See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (right to cross-examine ensures
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The right to cross-examine is the main right embodied in the
Confrontation Clause and was designed to evoke truth from the
trial process.7  Although face-to-face confrontation may enhance
this goal," it is not required to satisfy a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees .7  The Court has been especially willing to re-
strict the rights of a defendant where the crime involves a sexually
abused child.79 The Supreme Court, however, has required that a
defendant be afforded the opportunity for full and effective cross-
examination.80
integrity of fact-finding process); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 747 (1987) (defend-
ant's rights were not violated by his exclusion from competency hearing when he was given
opportunity for full and effective cross-examination); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,
54 (1987) (denying defendant state files did not violate defendant's constitutional rights
when cross-examination was guaranteed); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)
(primary right secured by Confrontation Clause is cross-examination of witness); United
States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515, 520 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting Supreme Court has empha-
sized importance of cross-examination as element of Confrontation Clause); see also JOHN
H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (cross-examination is "greatest
legal engine" ever invented for discovery of truth). But see Wildenthal, supra note 62, at
1337 (courts unjustifiably expanded right to cross-examine to be exclusive right guaranteed
by Confrontation Clause).
"6 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845 (central concern of Confrontation Clause is to ensure relia-
bility of evidence); Stincer, 482 U.S. at 736 (idea of confrontation is to promote reliability
of fact-finding process); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985) (per curiam) (cross-
examination protected by Confrontation Clause is designed to promote truth in criminal
proceeding). See generally Stincer, 482 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Confrontation
Clause is broader than merely allowing cross-examination).
" See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020. "The face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the
false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult." Id. Although often
thought of as contradictory, hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are both designed to
obtain the truth from the court proceeding. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741
(1992) (Court balances Confrontation Clause and admission of hearsay and steers middle
course recognizing they protect similar values); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)
(Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules "stem from the same roots"); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (hearsay rules, like Confrontation Clause are generally designed
to protect comparable values).
" See supra note 19 and accompanying text (stating that defendant's face-to-face con-
frontation is not absolute under Confrontation Clause).
"' See, e.g., Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747 (defendant denied access to competency hearing in
case involving sexually abused children); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 61 (1987)
(defendant in child sex abuse case denied access to statements made by witness to govern-
ment agency); United States v. Central Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir. 1988)
(court narrowly interpreted statute and penalized defendants for using minors in sexually
explicit materials). But see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990) (hearsay was inadmis-
sible because it was so unreliable and therefo'e violated defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses).
" See Green, 399 U.S. at 158. The Court held "[tlhere is good reason to conclude that
the Confrontation Clause is not violated . . . as long as [the witness is] subject to full and
effective cross-examination." Id.
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For example, in Kentucky v. Stincer,81 the defendant was prohib-
ited from attending the competency hearing of the state's in-
tended witnesses.82 The Court held that since the rights contained
in the Confrontation Clause were not absolute, the defendant's
rights were not violated by his exclusion from the hearing. 83 The
Court explained the defendant would have the opportunity for
full and effective cross-examination at trial.84
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,86 the defendant was denied discovery
of files8" maintained by the Children's Youth Services of Pennsyl-
vania which contained the abused child's accusations.8" The Su-
preme Court held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated
when the defendant was denied these records since he was af-
forded the opportunity for full cross-examination of the victim
during trial. 88 One factor that affected the decision was the state's
81 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
82 Id. at 732. The state planned on calling two of the three victims as witnesses. Id. A
competency hearing was conducted outside the presence of the defendant, and the judge
determined the children were competent to testify. Id. at 733.
83 Id. at 745. Following the Kentucky Supreme Court ruling which barred the defendant
from the competency hearing, the Supreme Court held that he .did not have an absolute
right to be present at every phase of the trial. Id. "[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees
only 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' " Id. at 739 (quoting
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam)). But see Stincer, 482 U.S at 753
(Marshall, J., dissenting). If the defendant represented himself he would have been allowed
attendance. Id. The majority's decision forced him to choose between hiring counsel and
being presented at this critical stage of trial. Id. "Having the defendant present ensures
that these inaccuracies are called to the judge's attention immediately-before the witness
takes the stand with the trial court's imprimatur of competency .... Id. at 750.
1 See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 743. Even though the respondent had not been present at the
competency hearing, at trial he had the opportunity to assist counsel fully in cross-examin-
ing the two witnesses. Id.
86 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43. During pre-trial discovery, the defendant subpoenaed files
from Children Youth Services. Id. The defendant sought files concerning the victim's state-
ments as well as files of a previous investigation, to better explore weaknesses in his ac-
cuser's story, but was denied access. Id. at 51.
87 Id. at 43. The state of Pennsylvania created the Children Youth Services to help
tackle the problem of child sexual abuse. Id. The Service maintained current files on al-
leged abusers, which included accusations against the defendant dating back to 1978. Id.
Id. at 54. The Court held that the defendant's interests were protected by in camera
review, and any material necessary for his defense could be provided as the trial
progressed. Id. at 60. The Court also imposed an affirmative duty on the judge to continue
to release new material as it became relevant. Id. See generally United States v. Phillip, 948
F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir. 1991) (defendant denied access to videotape after district court
decided that tape would not help defense in child abuse case); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866
F.2d 1185, 1221 (10th Cir. 1989) (in camera inspection by district court protects state's
interest of maintaining secrecy while ensuring defendant is provided with any information
needed for his defense).
[Vol. 8:339
SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN
compelling interest in keeping the files concerning sex abuse con-
fidential89 and to protect child victims from the trauma and em-
barrassment associated with testifying. 90 This factor was apparent
in both Stincer and Ritchie when the Court limited the information
available to the defendant to protect the child victim.91 However,
both decisions stated that even when information is limited, the
defendant's rights are preserved through full cross-examination.92
The use of closed circuit television, limitations on discovery,
and expansion of hearsay exceptions are essential where a child is
unwilling or unable to testify in the courtroom setting. However,
other methods should be implemented to assist the child witness.
Allowing the child to testify in the comfort of his or her home, via
videotaped testimony, or in a specially created "play room" estab-
lished in the courthouse would diminish the trauma of testifying.
In all these settings the defendant's counsel and presiding judge
would be present during cross-examination. By adopting these
procedures, it is suggested that the court would be furthering the
state's interest in protecting the well-being of child victims while
aiding in the prosecution of sexual abusers.
II. EXPANDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX ABUSERS
A. The Need for Tolling Provisions in the Statute of Limitation for Sex
Abuse
Over thirty years ago, James R. Porter allegedly molested
ninety-six children while serving as a Roman Catholic priest in
North Attleboro, Massachusetts.93 The case was first brought to
89 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60. The state has a compelling interest in both assuring that the
names of those who report abuse will be kept confidential and encouraging them to come
forward. Id. at 60-61; see supra note 21 (showing state's interest in preventing child abuse).
" See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (state's interest in protecting well-
being of children is compelling).
" See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739; Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53 (right to cross-examine does not
include power to require pre-trial disclosure of any and all information); Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (right to cross-examine is not absolute).
"' Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747 (defendant's rights were not violated by his exclusion from
competency hearing when he was given opportunity for full and effective cross-examina-
tion); Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54 (denying defendant state files did not violate defendant's con-
stitutional rights where cross-examination was guaranteed).
" Fox Butterfield, Ex-Priest Accused of Sex Abuse is Extradited, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992,
at A25 (while serving at St. Mary's Church from 1960 to 1967, Mr. Porter allegedly raped
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public attention when a forty year old man accused Mr. Porter of
raping him as a child. 94 While the District Attorney intends to
prosecute Mr. Porter for thirty-two of these crimes, the state will
be faced with the defense that the six-year statute of limitations
has expired, 6 precluding Mr. Porter's prosecution.9" As this ex-
treme situation illustrates, the severe trauma associated with child
sex abuse necessitates legislative reform in order to allow abusers
to be prosecuted at any time.97
The successful prosecution of the sex abuser is typically under-
mined because the child is afraid to report the abuse" or denies
that the abuse has occurred.99 The child often refuses to reveal
the identity of the abuser because he or she feels guilty, embar-
rassed, or afraid."' The trauma causes the child to become in-
troverted and often results in the child denying that he or she was
sexually abused.0 Without a tolling provision, the statute of limi-
or fondled ninety-six children).
94 Id. After Mr. Frank Fitzpatrick accused Mr. Porter of sexually abusing him, ninety-
five other men and women filed similar complaints with the District Attorney of Bristol
County. Id.
11 Id. Although Mr. Porter admitted to sexually abusing children, because the crimes
occurred so long ago the Bristol County District Attorney has acknowledged that it will be
difficult to successfully prosecute Mr. Porter on many of the charges because corroborating
evidence, such as a statement a victim made as a child, does not exist. Id.
SId.
o See Lamm, supra note 8, at 2193 n.3 (child victim usually will not reveal the abuse
until he or she is adult at which time statute of limitations has expired); Legislative Innova-
tions, supra note 8, at 806 n.7 (two out of three cases of sexual abuse go unreported). The
child will often keep the abuse a secret for a variety of reasons including fear, shame, and
embarrassment. See Allen, supra note 8, at 614-15 (abused child will not report abuse be-
cause fears family will have to split up or that he or she will be sent away).
" See supra note 8 (discussing how abuser uses his or her authority to threaten child into
submission).
" See Harshaw, supra note 4, at 756 (child often represses memory of abuse); Lamm,
supra note 8, at 2194 n.37 (abused child will deny that he or she has been sexually abused).
100 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (child will remain silent because of fear,
threats, or embarrassment). The most usual way the abuser keeps the child silent is
through threats and coercion. See Lamm, supra note 8, at 2193. The child is threatened
with the prospect that the family will be broken up or that the abuser will be sent to jail if
the child tells anyone. Id.; see also State v. Canton, No. L-90-256, 1991 WL 163497, at *1
(Ohio App. Aug. 23, 1991) (stepfather threatened harm to child and mother if sexual ac-
tivity reported to anyone); Jessica E. Mindlin, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal
Statutes of Limitation: A Model for Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV. 189, 190 n.10 (1990) (father told
daughter how he would be treated in prison if she told anyone of sexual abuse).
101 See Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 22 n.4 (Nev. 1990) (victim suffering from Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") may suffer nightmares and flashbacks, along with de-
creased concentration and lack of interest in activities); see also Harshaw, supra note 4, at
756. A child who represses all knowledge of sexual abuse suffers from PTSD. Id. A child
suffering from PTSD may exhibit the symptoms of secrecy, helplessness, delayed or con-
flicting disclosure, retraction and various phobias. Id.
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tations often expires prior to a complaint being filed. ° Since the
unyielding nature of the statute of limitations frequently prevents
abusers from being prosecuted, a majority of state legislatures
have mandated that the statute of limitations be tolled so that sex
offenders do not escape prosecution.10 3
B. Revising the Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations is a procedural tool used to avoid stale
claims, by compelling the assertion of a cause of action within a
specified period after it has accrued."0" In the majority of cases, a
cause of action accrues when the injured party knows or has rea-
son to know of his or her injury. 10 5 Since no federal statute of
limitations exists, the length of any statute of limitations is solely
determined by the law of the respective states.'0 6
102 See Mindlin, supra note 100, at 190-91. Once the statute of limitations expires, the
prosecution of the abuser is barred. d. A strict application of the statute of limitations in
civil actions has been advocated by some courts. Id.; see also Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552
So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (complaint held to be time-barred even
though memory was repressed until plaintiff entered therapy); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d
226, 228-29 (Wash. 1986) (court rejected delayed discovery citing burden placed on court).
,0 See infra notes 139-41 (discussing legislative approaches to tolling statute of
limitations).
' See Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (primary consideration underlying statutes of
limitation is fairness to defendant); see also "Board of Regents of Univ. of State of New York
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (statutes of limitation considered not only proce-
dural tools but fundamental to "well-ordered judicial system"); Kavanagh v. Noble, 332
U.S. 535, 539 (1948) (traditional procedural aspects of statutes of limitation strictly ad-
hered to). But see Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1964). The
Supreme Court held that where the interests of justice necessitated an adjudication of
plaintiff's claim, the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations would not be a de-
fense. Id. The Burnett Court recognized the protection that a statute of limitations afforded
the defendant, but explained that a federal statute of limitations could be tolled as long as
the plaintiff had not "slept on his rights." Id. at 429.
100 See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (cause of action accrued when loco-
motive fireman became aware of accumulated effects of deleterious substance). The discov-
ery rule set forth in Urie has been applied to product liability, employment, and personal
injury actions. See, e.g., Albert v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 905 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1990)
(statute of limitations for action concerning employee's hearing loss accrued from moment
he knew cause of injury); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (D.N.H.
1976) (statute of limitations tolled until plaintiff actually became blind from consistent use
of birth control pill), affid, 556 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1977).
" See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). The application of any stat-
ute of limitations depends upon what the legislature deemed a reasonable time for a plain-
tiff to commence an action, while still protecting courts and defendants from stale claims.
Id.; Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (statutes of limitation
are result of legislative determination); see also Liebig v. Liebig, 257 Cal. Rptr. 574, 575
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The Liebig court held that the legislature has the power to expressly
revive time-barred civil common law causes of action. Id. at 578; Burroughs, supra note 5,
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1. Judicial Responses to Tolling
Prior to judicially-created tolling doctrines and legislative enact-
ments, the expiration of a statute of limitations was an impermea-
ble barrier to bringing any cause of action. 10 7 Finding such a strict
application of the statute of limitations to be unjust, courts sought
ways to circumvent this barrier in particular instances.' 8 One
method, based in tort law, provided the statute of limitations to be
tolled to afford an injured party the opportunity to obtain proper
compensation for his or her injuries.' 9 This approach has been
used to allow a party to litigate a personal injury claim against his
or her abuser based upon sexual abuse which occurred when the
plaintiff was a minor."0 The courts adopted this approach to af-
ford the aggrieved party a remedy when prosecution of the al-
leged abuser was time-barred."' While this doctrine holds the
at 1014-15. The use of legislative means to extend the statutory period for commencing an
action in civil case is not an abuse of discretion because "statutes of limitations are mea-
sures of legislative grace, subject to legislative control." Id. at 1015; Durga M. Bharam,
Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse Offenses: A Time for Reform Utilizing the Discovery
Rule, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 842, 845 (1989). "State legislatures have created a wide
range of statutory limitation periods. Nationally, there is no consensus of an ideal limita-
tion period or applicable exceptions. State statutes of limitation range in the number of
years, the time at which the limitation period commences, and exceptions which toll the
limitation period." Id.
"" See infra note 151 (citing Supreme Court decisions respecting strict application of
statutes of limitation).
108 See infra note 109 (discussing application of tolling provisions as means of affording
injured parties compensation for stale tort claims).
109 See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(cancer did not manifest itself at same time asbestos discovered; therefore widow's wrong-
ful death action was not time-barred); VaSalle v. Celotex Corp., 515 N.E.2d 684, 687 (11.
Ct. App. 1987) (discovery rule applied where plaintiff, who was aware he had lung cancer,
did not discover it was caused by asbestos poisoning until later); Pierce v. Johns-Mansville
Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (statute of limitations tolled because
cause of decedent's cancer was not discovered until after his death); Romano v. Westing-
house, 336 A.2d 555, 560 (R.I. 1975) (plaintiff unaware of malfunction which caused tele-
vision to explode and house to be set afire until event actually occurred).
11 See Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (cause of action
allowed because plaintiff suppressed memory of abuse until undergoing therapy); Hammer
v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). In Hammer, the plaintiff was allowed
to sue her father under tort theory because she discovered that her father had sexually
abused her only after undergoing therapy. Id. The court explained that the daughter's lack
of mental stability kept her from acquiring the information necessary to determine the
nature of her injuries. Id.; see also Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (N.D. 1989)
(statute of limitations tolled because plaintiff suffered from severe emotional trauma which
resulted in her being unable to fully understand or discover her injuries within applicable
statute of limitations period).
111 See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 338 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring). The authority of the federal court to toll the statute of limitations on
equitable grounds is well established. Id. While the general rule is that even potential de-
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abuser responsible for past illegal conduct in civil actions, courts
and legislatures have begun to apply the same rationale to crimi-
nal cases.112
Prior to legislative codification of tolling provisions, the contin-
uing crime doctrine under Minnesota law,"' the concealment doc-
trine under Kansas law,11 and the secret manner approach under
Nevada law1. were judicial attempts to adopt the civil tolling pro-
visions to criminal sex abuse cases. For example, the continuing
crime doctrine recognizes that the abuser is often a family mem-
ber who uses his or her position of power to prevent the child
from reporting the abuse."1 If the abuser is a family member or
fendants should be protected from prosecution against claims in which facts may be ob-
scured by the passage of time, there are instances where the interests of justice will super-
sede defendant's right to be free from stale claims. Id. (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111, 117 (1979)); see also Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428
(1964) (policy of repose frequently outweighed where interests of justice require vindica-
tion of plaintiffs rights); Camille W. Cook & Pamela Kirkwood-Millsaps, Note, Redressing
Wrongs of the Blamelessly Ignorant Survivor of Incest, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) (unique
nature of incest survivor's injuries is exception to statute of limitations rule).
"' See infra notes 113-15 (discussing concealment, secret manner, and continuous crime
doctrine as three approaches which allow courts to toll statute of limitations). While courts
initially took the initiative, most legislatures have amended their statutes of limitation to
provide for delayed discovery. See Bharam, supra note 106, at 843; see also infra notes 139-
42 (discussing state legislatures applying tolling provisions).
"I See State v. Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352, 355-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In Danielski,
the parents' control over the child, which prevented outside intervention for eight years,
constituted continuing crime. Id. "Where the same parental authority that is used to ac-
complish criminal sexual acts against a child is used to prevent the reporting of the act, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the child is no longer subject to that
authority." Id. at 357; see also Mindlin, supra note 100, at 198 (parental authority used to
commit crime also used to prevent victim from reporting abuse). But see State v. French,
392 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (statute of limitations not tolled where de-
fendant did not control day-to-day movements or communications of victim).
I" See State v. Bentley, 721 P.2d 227, 230 (Kan. 1986). "To constitute concealment, it
must appear the accused's statements or conduct were calculated and designed to prevent
discovery of the crime with which he or she is charged." Id. at 229; see also State v. Palmer,
810 P.2d 734, 737 (Kan. 1991) (statute of limitations suspended for concealment of fact of
crime if defendant committed positive acts calculated to prevent discovery); cf. Morris v.
State, 595 So. 2d 840, 844 (Miss. 1991) (parental authority over child, including threats to
whip and abuse her if she told anyone, constituted concealment); State v. Tidwell, 775
S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (although defendant told children not to tell
anyone, children had ample opportunity to tell someone they were sexually abused and
therefore did not constitute concealment).
11. See, e.g., Walstrom v. State, 752 P.2d 225, 227 (Nev. 1988). A crime is committed in a
secret manner if "it is committed in a deliberately surreptitious manner that is intended to
and does keep all but those committing the crime unaware that an offense has been com-
mitted." Id. at 228.
"1 See Danielski, 348 N.W.2d at 356 (parents' success in maintaining coercive control
over victim did not bar state's prosecution); see also People v. Higgins, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
694, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (victim of sexual abuse unwilling to report abuse to authori-
ties due to fear of physical retaliation); Commonwealth v. Haber, 505 A.2d 273, 282 (Pa.
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other individual who continuously exercises power and control
over the child,117 the courts have held that such control consti-
tutes a continuing crime.11 Minnesota courts will therefore toll
the statute of limitations until the child is released from the
abuser's control." 9
Similar to the continuing crime doctrine, the concealment doc-
trine requires the abuser to exercise control over the victim in
order to invoke the statute of limitations toll.120 Kansas courts de-
fine "control" as the situation when the abuser's statements or
conduct are calculated and designed to prevent another person
from acquiring knowledge of the sexual abuse. 12 1
In Nevada, the courts have held that the secrecy doctrine will
be applied to toll the statute of limitations until discovery of the
offense if the abuser physically threatened the child into silence.12 2
While a crime against a person is not secret since the victim is
aware of the crime,2 the Nevada courts have explained that a
child, unlike an adult, generally cannot perceive the extent of his
or her injuries and therefore should not be held to the same re-
Super. Ct. 1986) (fear is relevant factor when court is ascertaining why child delayed re-
porting abuse).
117 Danielski, 348 N.W.2d at 352. Due to the stepfather's position of authority which he
exercised over the victim, the court determined that the crime continued even after he
raped her. Id. at 356.
11 Id. at 357 (defendant's acts in maintaining coercive control prevented victim from
reporting conduct and made offense continuing crime).
119 Id. at 356-57. The Danielski court explained that the statute of limitations could be
tolled because it will not be strictly applied when defendant's actions are the direct cause of
the delay in prosecution. Id. (emphasis added).
'go See State v. Bentley, 721 P.2d 227, 230 (Kan. 1986). The court reasoned that the
defendant did not have the necessary control over the child to establish concealment. Id.
Although the uncle threatened his niece, the victim saw him infrequently and therefore
could not rely on concealment to toll the statute of limitations. Id.; see also State v. French,
392 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (no control over day-to-day activities); State v.
Tidwell, 775 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (concealment negated when child
told friends).
12 Bentley, 721 P.2d at 229. The court also noted that -[c]rimes against persons, by their
very nature, cannot be concealed." Id. at 230.
122 Walstrom v. State, 752 P.2d 225, 227 (Nev. 1988). The court noted that when a
crime is committed in a secret manner, the defendant has acted in a calculated and in-
tended manner to keep others from discovering what he has done. Id. at 228; see also NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.095 (Michie 1991) (secret manner exception tolls statute of
limitations).
1' See Walstrom, 752 P.2d at 228. The traditional view is that crimes against individuals
cannot be secret because "the victim is aware of the crime and has a responsibility to re-
port it." Id.; see also Bentley, 721 P.2d at 230. The Bentley court refused to toll the statute of
limitations under the secrecy doctrine because while "[o]ther people may not know a crime
has occurred, [the] victim necessarily knows that a crime has been committed" and has the
ability to report. Id.
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porting time period." 4 While most courts were establishing judi-
cial exceptions to the statute of limitations, a few courts were un-
willing to apply a tolling provision. 8 For example, in Tyson v.
Tyson,' 26 the Washington Supreme Court held that a tolling provi-
sion was applicable only if the objective nature of the evidence
presented facts which supported a legitimate cause of action.1 27
To determine whether a legitimate claim existed and the statute
of limitations tolled, the judge would have to examine the evi-
dence that supported the cause of action and determine whether
it was reliable.' The Tyson court explained that the alleged
abuser should not have to defend against a claim based solely on
alleged recollection of events which were repressed from the
plaintiff's consciousness, and for which no means of independent
verification existed. 129
New York courts have been less responsive to requests for a
tolling provision in criminal cases, and have remarked that it is
the responsibility of the legislature to address the issue. a30 While
I Walstrom, 752 P.2d at 229. Due to the "inherent vulnerab[ility] of the child," the
court reasoned that a more flexible approach to the statute of limitations was necessary. Id.
at 228. The Nevada Supreme Court further stated that it was not willing to assign to a
child the adult responsibility of immediately reporting the crime. Id. at 228-29. Addressing
the Kansas Supreme Court's holding in Bentley, the Walstrom court emphasized the diffi-
culty for a child in reporting the crime, and noted that his or her limited emotional, intel-
lectual, psychological, and physical development should be taken into consideration when
determining whether to toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 228.
"2' See Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1117-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(victim's repressed memory was no reason to toll statute of limitations); Sears v. State, 356
S.E.2d 72, 74-75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (statute of limitations not tolled when victim had
knowledge of offense); Bentley, 721 P.2d at 230 (holding it is province of legislature, not
court, to make exception to statute of limitations); Bassile v. Covenant House, 192 Misc. 2d
88, 92, 575 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (Sup. Ct. New York Cty. 1991) (failure to perceive injury
will not toll statute of limitations).
1 6 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in North Coast Air Services,
Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 759 P.2d 405, 409 (Wash. 1988) (Tyson overruled by enactment of
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1993) (commencement of an action tolled
for a child until child reaches age of eighteen)).
17 Id. at 229. The Tyson court determined that the plaintiff lacked objective evidence
because her testimony was of events which occurred over seventeen years ago. Id. The
court feared that tolling would effectively eliminate the statute of limitations and increase
the likelihood of spurious claims. Id.
128 Id. To toll the statute of limitations, the Tyson court explained that the objective
nature of the evidence would have to make it substantially certain that facts could be fairly
determined. Id. The court refused to rely on the testimony of the treating physician or
psychiatrist to support the plaintiff's claim that she had only recently discovered she had
been abused, because of the subjective nature of their methods of investigation. Id.
12 Id. at 229-30 ("potential for spurious claims would be great and the probability of the
court's determining the truth would be unreasonably low").
1SO See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 154 Misc. 2d 46, 58, 584 N.Y.S.2d 713, 724
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the New York courts generally agree that a tolling provision
should be applied to child sexual abuse cases, 1' they are unwilling
to initiate a tolling doctrine on their own. 32 Instead, they empha-
size that any exception to the statute of limitations must be en-
acted through the state legislature.' However, while three pieces
of legislation have been drafted, two bills were never addressed by
the rules committee,3 and a third was approved by the Senate,
but vetoed by the Assembly.'35 The Assembly refused to approve
this bill because it would only benefit the victim who discovered
the abuse between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four, and not
the majority of victims, who do not discover the facts of their
abuse until after age twenty-five.' 3 6
Governor Mario Cuomo recently proposed a bill which would
give a child until his or her twenty-third birthday to file a com-
plaint.'37 The problem with this proposal is it merely tolls the stat-
ute of limitations until a victim is eighteen years old, and does not
address the problem the Assembly had with the previous Senate
proposal. Instead, legislation which tolls the statute of limitations
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 1992) (court noted that it was "appropriate at this time for the legis-
lature to consider whether such a compelling need exists with respect to the victim of
childhood sexual abuse"); Bassile v. Covenant House, 152 Misc. 2d 88, 92, 575 N.Y.S.2d
233, 236 (Sup. Ct. New York Cty. 1991) (departures from any statute of limitations are
subject for resolution by legislature).
3 See Anonymous, 154 Misc. 2d at 58, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 724 (suggesting legislature should
establish tolling provisions for crimes involving sexual abuse of children).
" See Bassile, 152 Misc. 2d at 92, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 236 (suggesting legislature is appro-
priate venue for resolution of tolling issue).
"I Id. The Bassile court explained that the legislature "has in fact decreed otherwise in
particular instances in which a compelling need has been felt [for example, toxic tort
cases]" and stated that until legislation is passed to provide for tolling, the basic approach
will be to strictly apply the statute of limitations. Id.
11 See S. Res. 4954, 214th Leg., 1991 N.Y. Reg. Sess. (extend "statute of limitations in
criminal matters to five years after twenty-first birthday or discovery, whichever comes
first"); S. Res. 5461, 214th Leg., 1991 N.Y. Reg. Sess. (extend "statute of limitations in
civil matters to three years after eighteenth birthday or discovery, whichever comes first").
"I See S. Res. 8881-A, 215th Leg., 1992 N.Y. Reg. Sess. ("extend statute of limitations
for criminal and civil action to within five and three years of discovery of the crime or the
twenty-first or eighteenth birthday, whichever comes first, respectively").
1"6 See Letter from Victoria Mayo, Legislative Assistant to New York State Senator
David A. Paterson, to James M. Steinberg, Staff Member, St. John's Journal of Legal Com-
mentary (Oct. 21, 1992) (on file with St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary). This piece of
legislation was unacceptable to the New York State Assembly because it would not aid the
group of victims who so desperately need access to the courts. Id. The Assembly has placed
priority on the passage of this legislation and expects negotiations to intensify during the
1993 session. Id.
... Nicholas Goldberg, New Sex-Abuse Law is Proposed, NEWSDAY, Mar. 24, 1993, at 35




until a victim is twenty-three years old should be enacted. Such a
tolling provision would give a victim an adequate amount of time
to "discover" his or her injury and therefore file a claim.
2. Legislative Approach to Tolling
Beyond judicial doctrines, most state legislatures have addressed
the necessity of providing a tolling provision to the statute of limi-
tations.1"8 While a number of states do not apply a statute of limi-
tations at all if a sexual crime is committed against a child, 139 the
majority of states have enacted legislation which tolls the statute
of limitations140 until the child reaches majority 4 or a responsible
adult or state agency is informed of the abuse. 4 2
The majority approach allows for tolling in cases where the vic-
tim represses all memories of the sexual abuse or is afraid to re-
port the abuse. 4 Legislatures have recognized that the emotional
See Burroughs, supra note 5, at 989. Numerous state legislatures have enacted legisla-
tion expanding the criminal statute of limitations for child sex abuse offenses in an effort to
facilitate criminal prosecution. Id. The Attorney General's office has also recognized the
need for an extension of such statutes of limitation. Id.; see also Kristin Rodgers, Note,
Childhood Sexual Abuse: Perceptions on Tolling the Statute of Limitations, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 309, 316 (1992) (legislators realize that relationship between authoritarian adult
offender and helpless child make reporting abuse unlikely).
"' See, e.g., ALA. CRIM. CODE § 15-3-5(a)(4) (Supp. 1992) (no statute of limitations for sex
offense involving children under sixteen years of age); MD. CTs & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 5-106 (1991) (no statute of limitations for felonies, which include sexual abuse of chil-
dren); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Michie 1992) (no statute of limitations for felonies, which
include sexual abuse of children); see also Bharam, supra note 106, at 845. Kentucky and
Rhode Island do not apply a statute of limitations to felonies, including child sexual abuse.
Id. The legislatures of North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming have
remained silent with regard to this issue, so it is implied that an action may be commenced
at any time. Id.
140 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(h) (Michie 1992) (statute of limitations tolled until
victim turns eighteen); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-401(1)(b)(7) (West 1992) (if victim
under fifteen years old, statute tolled for seven years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15(3)(b)(7)
(West 1992) (statute of limitations tolled until victim is sixteen years old); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 573(4) (West Supp. 1992) (statute tolled until victim is seventeen years old).
... See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-109(h) (Michie 1987) (action must be brought within
three years after victim reaches age of eighteen); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-6(d)
(Smith-Hurd 1989) (action may be commenced up until one year after victim attains age of
eighteen); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(b)(4) (West Supp. 1992) (permits commencement of
prosecution until five years after victim turns eighteen).
142 See, e.g., State v. Hensley, 571 N.E.2d 711, 715 (Ohio 1991) (statute of limitations
tolled until responsible adult learns of the abuse and its criminal nature); see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.15(3)(b)(7) (West 1992) (statute of limitations tolled until violation reported to
law enforcement agency); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 277, § 63 (West 1972) (amended 1987)
(statute of limitations tolled until victim is sixteen or abuse reported to law enfoicement
agency).
1' See supra note 97 (children repress memories of sexual abuse to overcome mental
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trauma suffered by children results in their inability to discover
their "injury" within the applicable statute of limitations pe-
riod. 44 Therefore, similar to the courts, legislatures have incorpo-
rated the tolling provision used in a personal injury claim based
on sexual abuse into criminal statutes of limitation.1
45
A minority of states follow an approach which tolls the statute
of limitations until a responsible adult 14' has knowledge that the
child is the victim of sexual abuse. 14 7 For example, in State v. Hens-
ley, a48 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that barring a crim-
inal prosecution based on the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions must be balanced against the need to ensure that those who
have committed sexual abuse do not escape criminal prosecution
anguish associated with abuse).
I" See Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (delayed discov-
ery applied if plaintiff can establish psychological repression due to tortious act); Osland v.
Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 908 (N.D. 1989) (daughter allowed to maintain assault and bat-
tery against father due to severe emotional trauma); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23,
26-27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (daughter maintained tort cause of action against father al-
though statute of limitations expired).
'" See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing legislative recognition of diffi-
culty in getting children to report abuse); see also Mary D., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (psycho-
logical mechanisms of denial and repression caused victim to be unaware of her psychologi-
cal injuries); State v. Bentley, 721 P.2d 227, 231 (Kan. 1986) (Herd, J., dissenting)
(horrified victim does not "necessarily know" that the acts of a trusted adult constitute a
crime punishable at law); Rebecca L. Thomas, Note, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual
Abuse and Statutes of Limitations: A Call for Legislative Action, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1245,
1254 n.69 (1991) (PTSD is clinically diagnosed disorder where memory of psychologically
unacceptable experience is partially or completely repressed).
146 See infra notes 147-49 (discussing legislation which requires responsible adult to re-
port sexual abuse of minor). For an example of a statute that defines responsible adult, see,
e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Baldwin 1990). According to the statute, a respon-
sible adult includes:
[An] attorney, physician, dentist, podiatrist, practitioner of a limited branch of
medicine or surgery as defined in § 4731.15 of the Revised Code, registered nurse,
licensed practical nurse, visiting nurse, other health care professionals, licensed psy-
chologist, licensed school psychologist, speech pathologist, or audiologist, coroner,
administrator or employee of a child day-care center, or other public or private ser-
vices agency, school teacher, school employee, social worker or person rendering
spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the tenets of a well known
religion.
ld.
47 See supra note 142 (citing Ohio, Florida, and Massachusetts legislative provisions
which toll statute of limitations until responsible adult has knowledge of abuse); see also
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal. v. Van de Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (California law imposes mandatory reporting requirement on individuals whose
professions bring them into contact with children); State v. Willette, 421 N.W.2d 342, 345
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (person responsible for child's care must report sexual abuse under
Child Abuse Reporting Act).
146 571 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio 1991).
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due to a child's failure to report the abuse. 149
Upon examination of the existing legislation, it seems the best
way to protect children is to combine the majority and minority
approaches to create one doctrine. States should amend or enact
legislation to toll the statute of limitations until either the victim is
twenty-three years old or a responsible adult has knowledge of the
sexual abuse. Since the protection of the child is of paramount
concern, such legislation would protect the child's interests by
holding the abuser responsible beyond the statutory period. A
careful analysis of such legislation reveals that it would not hinder
an accused abuser's constitutional rights.
C. Balancing Child's and Defendant's Rights
The traditional purpose of a statute of limitations has been to
protect a defendant's reasonable expectation that he or she will
not be brought into court long after the event, 150 and to en-
courage a potential plaintiff to timely file a claim before evidence
becomes unreliable.' 5' These policy considerations support what
has been described as a procedural tool of the judicial system
rather than a substantive right.'52 In other words, tolling provi-
'"9 State v. Hensley, 571 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ohio 1991). Revised Code § 2151.421 is an
attempt to balance the defendant's interest in having an action timely commenced against
him or her and the need to ensure that the abuser is prosecuted. Id. The guarantee of
defendant's right of repose should be outweighed "in light of the scope of the incest prob-
lem." See DeRose, supra note 4, at 217-18 (no public benefit in shielding incest perpetra-
tors from consequences of their actions); see also Harshaw, supra note 4, at 753 (legisla-
ture's role is to balance policy considerations to determine statute of limitations).
1 0 See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115-16 (1970) ("purpose of statute of
limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time
following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal
sanctions"); Developments in the Law, supra note 104, at 1185 (primary consideration under-
lying statute of limitations is fairness to defendant).
11 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979). "The right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Id. (citing Railroad
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); see also Burnett v.
New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("even if one has a just claim it is
unjust to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them");
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (statutes of limitation "are
pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims"); Patrick J. Kelley, The
Discovery Rule for Personal Injury Statutes of Limitation: Reflections on the British Experience, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 1641, 1643 (1978) (statute of limitations necessary to prevent injustice and
fraudulent manipulation of judicial process).
18. See Chase Securities, 325 U.S. at 314 (statutes of limitation have never been regarded
as what now is called a "fundamental" right or what used to be called a "natural" right of
the individual); F.D.I.C. v. Petersen, 770 F.2d 141, 142 (10th Cir. 1985) (statute of limita-
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sions are procedural devices which assist the substantive goal of
adjudicating charges of child sexual abuse, while respecting the
accused's substantive rights.15
While a defendant's reasonable expectations as to when he or
she may be prosecuted should be recognized, a policy of repose
should be outweighed by the interests of justice."" The policy
concerning the protection of a defendant's reasonable expecta-
tions relies heavily upon principles of self-reformation and reha-
bilitation.1 55 While this policy may be served in most cases, the
reality of child sex abuse indicates that the abuser does not reform
but continues to abuse children.1 5 Therefore, since this tradi-
tional policy is not served, it is appropriate to use a tolling
provision.
Lastly, proponents of a strict application of the statute of limita-
tions believe defendants should be protected from having to de-
fend against stale allegations which are supported by evidence
which may no longer be reliable.1 57 While this consideration is
tions generally considered procedural rather than substantive law); see also Developments in
the Law, supra note 104, at 1180 (statutes of limitation do not create substantive rights).
"I See supra note 111 (citing case law recognizing that statutes of limitation not substan-
tive). For defendants who fear the loss of substantive rights, modern rules of evidence will
suffice to exclude unreliable and prejudicial evidence. See DeRose, supra note 4, at 218-19.
Such an approach therefore does not compromise the defendant's opportunity for a fair
trial. See Mindlin, supra note 100, at 206 n.96.
15 See Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (statute of limitations should be waived in interests of
justice); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 921 (1st Cir. 1987) (interests of justice
promote tolling where defendant aware government sought to punish him); Smith v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 1978) (tolling appropriate
where defendant actively misled plaintiff respecting cause of action or plaintiff prevented
from asserting rights).
15 See Harshaw, supra note 4, at 753 n.1 1 (courts have recognized that policy behind
statute of limitations includes "recognition of self-reformation by potential defendants").
In believing a potential defendant will reform, he must be allowed to carry on and make
plans for the future without having to worry about the threat of a late claim. See Kelley,
supra note 151, at 1644.
1"6 See Nora Underwood, The Abuse of Children, MACLEAN HUNTER LTD., Nov. 27, 1989,
at 56. Even after treatment, pedophiles are more likely to repeat their offense because they
suffer from a life-long sexual attraction to children which cannot be cured with drugs and
therapy. Id.; see also Elsa L. Walsh, Health Professionals Discuss Sexual Abuse, WASH. POST,
June 5, 1980, at 10 (places percentage of repeat offenders at thirty-five percent); Vivienne
Walt, State Lawmakers Eye Rape Bills, NEWSDAY, May 5, 1991, at 43 ("national crime statis-
tics show that about forty-two percent of sex criminals repeat their offenses").
157 See Chase Securities v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1945) (statutes of limitation
are practical and pragmatic devices to spare courts and citizens from litigating stale claims);
Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L & P Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1992) (function of
statute of limitations is to bar claims asserted after "evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared" (citing American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538 (1974))); Hart v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 818 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (statute of
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based on fairness to a defendant, 158 such a policy should be out-
weighed by the necessity of a procedural device which affords the
victim additional time to report abuse. Since the prosecution of
child abusers is hindered by the victim's inability to "discover" the
crime within the statutory period, 5 9 the victim should not be pe-
nalized for what he or she has no control over. Further, the mod-
ern rules of evidence protect a defendant's rights."' Hearsay rules
exclude evidence which may be unreliable or prejudicial.1 6
Therefore, while charges may be filed, an alleged abuser's fate
will depend on all the evidence presented and not solely the
accusation.
CONCLUSION
Despite the initiatives of courts and legislatures, barriers to the
successful prosecution and conviction of child sex abusers remain.
A flexible approach to the Confrontation Clause and expanded
hearsay exceptions assist the child with the traumatic experience
of testifying about the sex abuse in front of the defendant. How-
ever, these measures do not go far enough. Further legislation al-
lowing videotaped testimony and a courthouse "play room" are
necessary to calm the child's fear of testifying. In addition, uni-
form legislation which tolls the statute of limitations until the vic-
tim is twenty-three years old or until an adult is informed of the
limitations puts end to possibility of litigation after reasonable time); Gould v. United
States Dep't of Health & Human Services, 905 F.2d 738, 741 (4th Cir. 1990) (right to be
free from stale claims prevails over right to prosecute); see also Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d
226, 229 (Wash. 1986) ("recollections of memories usually become unreliable in a matter
or minutes, much less years").
"" See Developments in the Law, supra note 104, at 1185 n.83 (defendant should not be
"called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and wit-
nesses have disappeared'" (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944))).
." See supra note 8 (discussing a victim's penchant to "block out" all memory of sexual
abuse).
160 See DeRose, supra note 4, at 218. The strict date-of-injury accrual seems less compel-
ling today. Id. An inflexible statute of limitations was necessary in the past because exclu-
sionary rules were not developed. Id. (citing Kelley, supra note 151, at 1645-46). "The
need for an inflexible statute of limitations to prevent injustices must have seemed greater
than it does now when more narrowly tailored evidentiary rules eliminate unreliable evi-
dence." Id.
"' See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (hearsay is statement, other than one made by declarant
while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove truth of matter asserted);
FED. R. EvID. 802 (hearsay not admissible except as provided by federal rules and as pre-
scribed by Supreme Court).
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abuse is necessary to protect all victims of child abuse. While these
initiatives will assist in the prosecution of child sex abusers, they
also ensure that the substantive rights of the alleged abusers are
not compromised.
These proposals must be adopted by the few remaining states
that have been slow to act. While New York, for example, has
legislation which provides for closed-circuit televised testimony,
the legislature has failed to address the compelling need for a toll-
ing provision. However, New York is not alone. Even those states
which have eased the burdens of testifying should incorporate the
proposals outlined above to fulfill their commitment to assisting
child victims. Only by taking these final steps can the law prevent
child abusers from walking free, simply because the victim they
preyed upon was a child.
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